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oday there is a consensus 
that a central bank can best
contribute to good economic 
performance by pursuing price stabil-
ity — and that it should remain inde-
pendent from political forces. In the
case of price stability, this understand-
ing evolved over decades of experi-
ence. The notion of independence of
the central bank was more difficult to
fulfill. 
The original conception of the
Federal Reserve System when it was
created in 1913 was meant to continue
the spirit of the “independent treasury
system” that existed in the pre-Fed
era. That system assumed that the U.S.
Treasury would store its gold and
assets in its own vaults lest it unduly
influence the markets for credit and
money. Ideally, Treasury meddling in
what passed for monetary policy at the
time was to be avoided.
Yet for most of the first four
decades of its existence, a lack of 
independence was characteristic of
the Federal Reserve. The hand of the
executive branch of the U.S. govern-
ment was ever-present when the Fed
began operations in November 1914.
The 1913 act that created the Fed
made the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Comptroller of the Currency
ex officio members of the Board. 
In fact, the Treasury secretary
presided over all meetings in those
early days. The Board did not have 
its own building — they held their
meetings in the Treasury building
instead. 
Thus, the evolution of monetary
policy cannot be understood without
an understanding of the changes 
and personalities involved in the 
evolution of the Fed as an institution.
Throughout much of its history, the
struggle for independence has often
occurred in conjunction with changes
in policy — and these changes have
tended to reinforce each other.
Wars, Depression, and
Dependence
When the United States entered
World War I in April 1917, the Federal
Reserve almost instantly became the
primary vehicle for financing the war
effort. The main function of the Fed
during those war years was to lend
money to banks to purchase “Liberty
Loans” bonds from the U.S. Treasury.
They loaned the money at a discount-
ed rate — not coincidentally lower
than the interest rate on the war bonds
— to entice bond purchasers. After
the war, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York remained the official 
fiscal agent of the U.S. Treasury
Department.
In the post-war years, the Fed 
busied itself with maintaining the
newly reconstructed gold standard. 
Its missteps in the wake of the stock
market of October 1929 contributed
to the impression that the Fed was
powerless. 
Political forces retained the upper
hand in the economic upheaval of the
Great Depression. As economist Allan
Meltzer points out in his
history of the Fed, monetary
policy would basically be
dictated by Congress and
the White House between
1933 and 1951. For instance,
after Franklin Roosevelt
became president in 1933 he
assumed emergency powers
that explicitly took the
United States off the gold
standard. Congress would
later that year mandate that
the Fed issue “reserve notes”
not backed by gold. The Fed
was forced to freeze its asset portfolio
and the monetary base was effectively
determined by the Treasury. 
Additionally, the Federal Reserve
structure as we know it today is a by-
product of the policy actions taken
during the Great Depression. Many of
Although the Fed Board of Governors
moved into their own building in 1937, 
their independence in monetary policy 
wasn’t established until 1951. The 
headquarters was named the Eccles
Building — after the former Fed 
chairman influential in achieving 















































Sthem were motivated by a desire of policymakers to further
centralize control over monetary policy. When Roosevelt
went looking for a new head of the Federal Reserve Board,
he settled on Marriner Eccles, an assistant to his Treasury
secretary. Yet Eccles told the president he wouldn’t take the
job unless the Fed was reformed to give the Board more
power over the regional Fed banks. The 1935 amendment to
the Federal Reserve Act modified the FOMC and Eccles
became its chief. He would serve as chairman until 1948.   
While the 1935 act took the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Comptroller of the Currency off the Fed Board, it didn’t
translate into a softer hand by the executive branch in mon-
etary policymaking. When the United States entered World
War II, the Fed became again a mechanism by which the
government could more cheaply finance the war effort. In
April 1942, the Fed announced a policy of cooperating with
the Treasury to keep interest rates low. By 1947, the Fed was
summarizing its “primary duty” as “the financing of military
requirements and of production for war purposes.” In his
memoirs, Eccles even described his work during this period
as “a routine administrative job” as the Fed “merely execut-
ed Treasury decisions.” Alan Sproul, the president of the
New York Fed, lamented, “We are not the masters in our
own house.”
The Accord
After the war, Eccles — worried about inflation — began to
make strong statements behind the scenes to the effect that
the Fed should no longer support the prices of Treasury
bonds. The “peg,” as it was called, was the rule by which the
Fed would buy up those Treasury securities if prices fell as a
result of a sell-off. President Truman didn’t take kindly to the
Fed’s new stirrings of independence and told Eccles that he
would not be reappointed when his term as chairman was
over in 1948. He was replaced by Thomas McCabe but
stayed on the Board as vice chairman.
Yet many within the Fed, particularly New York’s Sproul,
were worried about the loss of Fed independence. For the
next two years, the Fed and the Treasury would cooperate
but in a rather tense and uneasy way. While the Treasury
bond peg remained mostly intact, the stage was slowly being
set for a showdown.
The spark that ignited the next consequential chain of
events was the Korean War which began on June 26, 1950.
Although the first year of that war was financed mainly by
tax increases, the Treasury Secretary John Snyder made no
secret of his department’s commitment to keeping the Fed
in the business of maintaining the bond price peg.
The FOMC had other ideas in mind. Still wary of infla-
tion, Fed policymakers were eager to raise the short-term
interest rate to reduce the money supply and stave off price
increases. That would also have an effect on government
financing of debt — it would drive down the price of bonds,
which is always inversely correlated with the interest rate,
and also increase the government’s cost of borrowing.
After the August 1950 FOMC meeting, a movement was
afoot to persuade Snyder to accept a small increase in short-
term interest rates. At that meeting, Sproul raised a
challenge: The FOMC “should not seek instructions” from
the U.S. Treasury. Eccles agreed and said that if the Fed is
“expected to survive as an agency with any independence
whatsoever [it] should exercise some independence.” 
President Truman was also willing to try to influence Fed
policy. In early December 1950, he phoned McCabe at his
home and urged him to “stick rigidly” to the pegged bond
rates. “I hope the Board will not allow the bottom to drop
from under our securities. If that happens that is exactly
what Mr. Stalin wants.”
To help smooth relations and try to persuade the admin-
istration to change their stance on the bond peg, McCabe
met with Truman and Snyder at the White House on Jan. 17,
1951. The chairman stated the concerns of the Fed and the
meeting ended without a specific resolution. McCabe
seemed convinced that their conversation would continue
behind the scenes at a later date.
But the next day Snyder delivered a speech to the New
York Board of Trade in which he announced that McCabe
had agreed with the Treasury’s peg policy. This infuriated the
members of the FOMC. The minutes of the Fed meeting
record that McCabe reported to his colleagues that he had
made no such commitment.
The Fed decided to fight back. At their January 29 meet-
ing, in a challenge to the Treasury, the Fed allowed the price
of the pegged government bond to drop. The action
prompted Truman to call the entire FOMC to the White
House to apply some pressure the next day. It was the first
time a U.S. president had done such a thing.     
As Meltzer describes it, “The meeting with the president
smothered the conflict in ambiguity. Everyone seemed to
agree, but no one changed position.” Yet the FOMC mem-
bers also were confident that nothing said at the meeting
could have been construed as an endorsement of the
Treasury’s policy position.
At noon on February 1, the White House released a press
statement that took the Fed policymakers by surprise: The
Truman administration announced that the Federal Reserve
Board had agreed to the peg policy. In his memoirs, Eccles
noted that if swift action was not taken , the Federal Reserve
would lose the independent status Congress meant it to have
and “would be reduced to the level of a Treasury bureau.” 
The fight for Fed independence also began to hone the
thinking of Fed policymakers about the nature of inflation
and the consequences of pegging the interest rate of
Treasury bonds. By committing to a policy of buying those
bonds when the price fell below an arbitrary level, the
FOMC members began to understand that they were
expanding the money supply. Richmond Fed economist
Robert Hetzel and former Board of Governors economist
Ralph Leach suggests this marked an “intellectual water-
shed.” “Gone,” they write, “was the self-image of a central
bank that allows an ‘elastic currency’ passively to ‘accommo-
date commerce.’ The Fed moved toward the idea of control 
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of money creation to stabilize the purchasing power of the
dollar.”
The Fed forced resolution of the dispute on February 19.
That day it informed the Treasury that it “was no longer will-
ing to maintain the existing situation in the Government
security market.” As Sproul recounted in congressional testi-
mony a year later, the Fed also let them know that unless
there was someone at the Treasury who could work out a
prompt and definitive agreement with them, they “would
have to take unilateral action.”
The Treasury finally acknowledged the need to end the
public dispute by holding a meeting at the White House
between the president and other government policymakers.
Snyder, however, was not at the meeting. He was in the 
hospital recovering from surgery. Instead, he left the negoti-
ations in the hands of William McChesney Martin, assistant
secretary of the Treasury.
After a few days of negotiation, the parties involved
agreed on what became known as the Treasury-Fed Accord.
As ratified, it read: “The Treasury and the Federal Reserve
System have reached full accord with respect to debt-man-
agement and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering
their common purpose to assure the successful financing of
the Government’s requirements and, at the same time, to
minimize monetization of the public debt.” 
This newfound independence by the central bank would
mark the start of a new era for the Fed. “For the first time
since 1934, the Federal Reserve could look forward to con-
ducting monetary actions without approval of the Treasury,”
writes Meltzer. Now the Fed “faced the task of rediscovering
how to operate successfully.”
That task would have to be undertaken with a new leader.
In one final shot at the Fed, Truman told McCabe that his
“services were no longer satisfactory.” Even though his term
ran until 1956, McCabe agreed to resign — but only under
the condition that he be replaced with someone who would
pass muster with the FOMC. The president appointed
William McChesney Martin, one of the key figures in the
Treasury-Fed Accord negotiations. He would go on to serve
for almost 19 years once he assumed office on April 2, 1951 —
the longest term of any chairman to this day.
ABrief Detour
The Martin era is still seen today as a vital period during
which the Fed was established as a credible and autonomous
policymaking body. Part of the success of the Martin years
was the unwillingness of President Dwight Eisenhower to
meddle in Fed policy the way his predecessors had.
On the other hand, throughout his presidency Lyndon
Johnson was eager to get Martin to pursue an easy money
policy to assist him in funding both the Vietnam War and his
deficit-fueled increases in government spending. Johnson
frequently criticized Martin’s policies in private meetings
and asserted that he seemed intent on hurting Johnson 
politically.
LBJ’s crusade to steer Martin was ultimately an ineffec-
tive one. Yet Johnson did reappoint Martin in 1966 for what
would become his last term as Fed chairman.
Another president for whom Fed policy was seen as a tool
to influence political outcomes was Richard Nixon. In his
memoirs he was quite outspoken about how he thought the
tight Federal Reserve monetary policy virtually killed his
chances of getting elected president in 1960. 
In 1970, President Richard Nixon was intently pursuing a
political strategy that had as one of its goals increased
employment through easy money. He appointed Arthur
Burns as Fed chairman with the expectation — sometimes
explicitly stated — that he would be more sympathetic to
using monetary policy to pull unemployment down. During
an applause-filled interlude at Burns’ swearing-in ceremony,
Nixon famously turned to him and said: “You see, Dr. Burns,
that is a standing vote of appreciation in advance for lower
interest rates and more money.”
Burns was initially sympathetic, and that mutual expecta-
tion married a shift in monetary policy with a close
relationship between the White House and the Fed that 
didn’t exist since the pre-Martin days. Burns, like Nixon, 
had a view of inflation that made him prone to believing that
hard-money Fed policies would be misguided in the 1970s.
He came to believe the “cost-push” model of price increases
in which inflexible labor union contracts were keeping
wages artificially high and contributing to inflation in 
the price of goods that utilized that labor. In that model,
monetary policy was ineffective at battling inflation in the
short term.   
The temporary weakening of Fed independence under
Burns wasn’t motivated only by the president’s steps toward
assuring a compliant Fed. They were also facilitated by
Burns himself who was quite willing to bargain with the
White House to achieve policy outcomes that he saw as crit-
ical to defeating cost-push inflation. Economic historians
acknowledge that he at least tacitly promised an easy money
policy to the White House in exchange for Nixon’s imposi-
tion of wage and price controls.
The consensus of the economics profession since then is
that such controls and the easy money policy that accompa-
nied them were harmful to the economy. The high inflation
it created led to a period of economic stagnation that lasted
until the early 1980s.
What broke the cycle was the appointment of Paul 
Volcker as chairman in 1979. Volcker was able to restore not 
only a more Martin-esque monetary policy by taming infla-
tion and slowing money growth but also restore the
independence and credibility of the Fed. Political support in
such an endeavor was also important, and the lack of med-
dling by both presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
was crucial to that success.      
ANew Accord?   
Just as policy shifts in the past have been tied to shifts in Fed 
independence, a new concern among some economists is 
continued on page 33ing of slave property over other forms of property in the
antebellum days.
In April 1862, voters of the then-fledgling state approved
the new constitution, and in May the new “Restored
Government of Virginia” petitioned the U.S. Congress for
recognition of the state. As Congress deliberated, the Union
was effective at holding the line in West Virginia despite a
few attempts by the Confederate army to capture territory.
Indeed, when the de facto legislature of West Virginia sent
to the Virginia General Assembly a request to secede in May,
it was granted. When Congress finally granted approval in
December and President Lincoln concurred, the only step
to be taken was a referendum terminating slavery in their
territory, which passed handily. 
The state of West Virginia was accepted into the Union
on June 20, 1863. It has the distinction of being one of only
two states formed during the Civil War (the second was
Nevada). Additionally, it was the only state to form by seced-
ing from a Confederate state (though similar proposals were
debated in other states, including North Carolina and
Tennessee). 
Yet, while many of the debates about secessions are 
largely looked upon as epic battles over abolition, West
Virginia’s secession was mainly the result of economic con-
cerns. As Rasmussen notes, those most eager to secede from
the Old Dominion were acting on “an extremely rational
expression of enlightened self-interest.” In retrospect, it’s 
no mystery why the western counties sought to leave
Virginia. Perhaps a more difficult question is why the 
marriage persisted as long as it did. RF
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whether current Fed actions may jeopardize Fed independ-
ence in the future. This recession has spurred new
expansions in the Fed’s loan portfolio, opening up its lending
window to institutions that were not privy to Fed funds
before the economic downturn. Indeed, some have argued
that this has been a long-standing shift in Fed credit policy
that started with lending meant to prop up the Penn Central
Railroad in 1970, the infusion of liquidity the Fed provided
to the failing Continental Illinois National Bank in 
1984, and the engineered bailout of Long-Term Capital
Management in 1998.
Consequently, economist Marvin Goodfriend, formerly
of the Richmond Fed and currently of Carnegie Mellon
University, has proposed a “new accord” for Fed credit 
policy. Meant to mimic what the Treasury-Fed Accord did
for monetary policy, the goal would be to place explicit
boundaries on actions that could harm Fed independence. 
“It’s important to appreciate the difficulties to which the
Fed exposes itself in the pursuit of credit policy initiatives
that go beyond traditional last resort lending to banks,”
notes Goodfriend. Not only does it open the door for more
congressional pressure to lend to some and not to others,
but it also puts the Fed in an untenable position when the
Fed must cooperate with the Treasury on items such as
banking regulation and payments system policy. “This inter-
dependence exposes the Fed to political pressure to make
undesirable concessions with respect to its credit policy ini-
tiatives in return for support on other matters.”
Only time will tell whether the recent expansion in Fed
lending will be temporary or not. In the meantime, it’s
important to understand the historical experience of the
Fed. The independence of the Fed is something that Fed
policymakers still tend to guard closely. Yet it’s not always
the case that independence is taken away all at once as it has
been in previous decades, particularly during wartime. Some
Fed observers and policymakers worry that actions that may
seem well-intentioned and short-lived today could chip away
at Fed autonomy over the long term. RF
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